Trump Revives Nixon's 'Madman Diplomacy' to Drive a Wedge Between Moscow and Beijing — A Risky Move With Potential Backlash

In 1896, when U.S. President William McKinley promoted high-tariff protectionism, he contended that shielding domestic industries from overseas rivals through a 50% tariff barrier would enrich America and enhance national security.

That reasoning shaped American trade discussions for decades, yet it was merely an economic tool—not a strategic political instrument.

In 2025, with Donald Trump serving as the 47th President of the United States, he imposed tariffs on the majority of goods coming into the country, particularly focusing on those from China.

Nevertheless, even though he idolises McKinley, Trump’s developing overarching strategy appears more akin to Richard Nixon’s rather than his own tariff plan. "erratic" diplomacy of the early 1970s .

Trump is signalling that unpredictability, not price schedules, will coerce adversaries and reorder alliances.

A picture depicting unyielding determination

In the 1890s, McKinley's tariffs almost doubled the typical taxes on imports, protecting local industries but failing to significantly alter the worldwide distribution of influence.

The message from these tariffs was clear: protectionism might benefit certain industries, but it seldom alters competitors' strategic decisions.

During his initial term, Trump engaged with trade wars reminiscent of McKinley's approach, along with discussions on industrial policy and "America First" rhetoric. For his second term, his strategy shifts towards more ominous, Nixon-era territory.

Nixon and his Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, projected an appearance of unpredictable determination. They suggested they could take "any action," including potentially using nuclear arms, to extract compromises from Vietnam and instill fear within the Soviet Politburo.

Nixon’s top aide at the White House, H.R. Haldeman, remembered the president pressuring Moscow and Hanoi to view him as a tough individual " with his finger on the nuclear trigger ”.

The strategy aligned perfectly with a daring shift in diplomacy. By reaching out to Mao Zedong’s China, Nixon aimed to encircle the Soviet Union.

Trump’s ‘reverse Nixon’ efforts

Fifty years later, Trump seems to be replaying the recording in reverse.

Instead of distancing China from Russia, he is testing whether Moscow could be detached from Beijing.

In early April, he introduced a flat 54% tariff on Chinese products — however, Russia, Cuba, and North Korea were not subject to these stringent charges.

The White House has concurrently suggested potential partial easing of sanctions against Moscow if Vladimir Putin demonstrates "flexibility" regarding Ukraine.

Trump’s supporters refer to this tactic as a "reverse Nixon": win over the less powerful opponent to constrain the more formidable one.

Al-Jazeera recently reported Senior U.S. officials and analysts think that strengthening relations with Russia might fracture the close alliance between China and Russia, which has worried American strategic planners for some time now.

But Foreign Affairs warns Even with Washington offering generous rewards, Putin would likely "maneuver between Washington and Beijing" instead of picking a side.

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute is more straightforward about it: the notion of separating the two is “ a delusion ”.

Furthermore, the crazy act doesn’t necessarily scare anyone. note Nixon’s ploy was successful solely when combined with meticulous behind-the-scenes diplomatic efforts; the appearance of unpredictability still needed a clear objective.

Trump’s record of erratic statements on NATO, sudden tariff escalations and social media outbursts risks convincing adversaries that chaos is the message, not the method.

Success would require discipline

Nevertheless, the strategic advantage is genuine.

A strong partnership between China and Russia compels the United States to divide its efforts between two regions, makes implementing sanctions more difficult, and provides Beijing with access to Russian natural gas and advanced weaponry.

Even just having Russia adopt neutrality in a hypothetical Indo-Pacific crisis, such as maintaining a neutral stance, could ease some of America’s burdens and put China at a disadvantage.

Can Trump craft a credible offer? Tariff exemptions and the hint of sanctions relief are carrots; resumed arms‑control talks and guarantees of Russian equities in a post‑war Ukraine settlement could sweeten the pot.

The indicators are straightforward: increasing tariffs and technology restrictions on China, along with expanded US natural gas exports designed to counterbalance Chinese-Russian energy agreements.

The reality is that CIA Director John Ratcliffe made the call China The "paramount national security threat" mentioned during his confirmation hearings earlier this year — with Russia being considered a less significant threat — highlights the established order of importance.

Nevertheless, success would demand disciplined communication and support from allies, qualities rarely linked with erratic dramatics.

Should Europe and the Indo-Pacific allies fear that Washington might sacrifice Ukraine’s security or exchange their markets for temporary peace with Moscow, this could lead to weakened solidarity.

In the case of Australia, the consequences are enormous.

For Canberra, the calculation is clear-cut.

Australia’s main challenge is a more forceful China, rather than a far-off Russia.

Should Trump manage to create even a slight rift between Moscow and Beijing, the power dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region would shift in favor of the United States and its allies.

If Russia is focused on Europe or merely reluctant to share advanced missile and space technologies, this could leave China lacking essential support systems.

Conversely, a bungled “reverse Nixon” strategy could embolden both autocracies.

Should Putin be allowed to gain from US tariff exemptions and sanctions relief while strengthening defense relationships with Beijing—considering the recent drone and satellite agreements? suggest — Australia could confront a starker, more unified antagonistic block.

For Australia, the key takeaway is to diversify strategies: keep enhancing technological collaboration within AUKUS, expedite the procurement of long-range striking capabilities, and strengthen diplomatic cooperation with Japan, India, and ASEAN countries.

For Australia, which sits on Asia’s fault line, the implications are enormous. If a divide succeeds, it could alleviate stress on the " first‑island chain – the string of strategic islands extending from Japan through Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia – which provides Canberra with valuable strategic depth.

A unsuccessful move could lead to Australian forces facing off against a pair of nuclear-armed challengers ( Russia and China ) who feel empowered due to a misstep by the United States.

Ian Langford is not employed by, does not provide consulting services for, nor holds any shares in or receives financial support from any entity that could gain from this article. He has declared no additional associations apart from his academic position.